<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>DSpace Collection:</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/1880/47051</link>
    <description />
    <pubDate>Wed, 19 Jun 2013 06:06:57 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2013-06-19T06:06:57Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>A Framework for Expressing and Enforcing Purpose-Based Privacy Policies</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/1880/49351</link>
      <description>Title: A Framework for Expressing and Enforcing Purpose-Based Privacy Policies
Authors: Jafari, Mohammad; Fong, Philip; Safavi-Naini, Reihaneh; Barker, Ken
Abstract: Purpose is a key concept in privacy policies and has been mentioned in major privacy laws and regulations.&#xD;
Although some models have been proposed for enforcing purpose-based policies, little has been done in&#xD;
de ning formal semantics for purpose and therefore an e ective enforcement mechanism for policies has&#xD;
remained a challenge. In this paper, we develop a framework for formalizing and enforcing purpose-based&#xD;
privacy policies. Purpose is formally de ned as the dynamic situation of an action within the network of&#xD;
inter-related actions in the system. Accordingly, we propose a modal-logic language for formally expressing&#xD;
constraints about purposes of actions which can be used to model purpose-based policies. The semantics of&#xD;
this language are de ned over an abstract model of activities in the system which is directly derivable from&#xD;
business processes.&#xD;
Based on this formal framework, we discuss some properties of purpose and show how some well-known,&#xD;
as well as new forms of purpose constraints can be formalized using the proposed language. We also show&#xD;
how purpose-based constraints can be tied to other access control policies in the system. Finally, we present&#xD;
a model-checking algorithm for verifying whether a given state of the system complies with a given set of&#xD;
policies, followed by a discussion of how this can be used in an actual implementation of a purpose reference&#xD;
monitor.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Jan 2013 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/1880/49351</guid>
      <dc:date>2013-01-28T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Specification and Compilation of Obligation Policies for Program Monitoring</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/1880/48922</link>
      <description>Title: The Specification and Compilation of Obligation Policies for Program Monitoring
Authors: Xu, Cheng; Fong, Philip
Abstract: The core component of an extensible software system must protect its resources from being&#xD;
abused by untrusted software extensions. The access control policies of extensible software&#xD;
systems are traditionally enforced by some form of reference monitors. Recent studies of access&#xD;
control policies advocate the use of obligation policies, which impose behavioural constraints on&#xD;
the future actions of the accessor even after the access is granted. It is argued that obligation&#xD;
policies provide continuous protection to the system.&#xD;
We envision the workflow of developing an obligation policy for program monitoring to involve&#xD;
three stages: specification, implementability check and implementation. In this work, we&#xD;
develop a series of tools to facilitate each stage of the workflow. First, we propose a policy&#xD;
language for formulating obligation policies. Second, we devise a type system for syntactically&#xD;
identifying if an obligation policy is enforceable or not. The type checker guides the policy&#xD;
developer in refining an obligation policy into an enforceable one. Finally, we design a compilation&#xD;
algorithm, which compiles well-typed obligation policies to a representation of reference&#xD;
monitors, called Obligation Monitor (OM). The OM is designed to facilitate monitor inlining.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 17:20:16 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/1880/48922</guid>
      <dc:date>2012-03-26T17:20:16Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Access Control Policy Analysis with a Visualization Tool for Social Network Systems</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/1880/48453</link>
      <description>Title: Access Control Policy Analysis with a Visualization Tool for Social Network Systems
Authors: Fong, Philip; Anwar, Mohd
Abstract: Understanding privacy implications of access control policies is a&#xD;
complex task for the users of social network systems. Users need&#xD;
tool support to articulate on access scenarios and perform policy&#xD;
analysis. In this work, we develop a prototypical tool for reflective&#xD;
policy assessment (RPA) – a process in which a user examines her&#xD;
profile from the viewpoint of another user in her extended&#xD;
neighborhood in the social graph. Since an unrestricted view of&#xD;
one's extended neighborhood may compromise the privacy of&#xD;
others, our visualization tool approximates the extended&#xD;
neighborhood of a user in such a way that policy assessment can&#xD;
still be conducted in a meaningful manner, while the privacy of&#xD;
other users is preserved. We verify the utility and usability of our&#xD;
tool in a within-subject user study.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Mar 2011 16:27:12 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/1880/48453</guid>
      <dc:date>2011-03-17T16:27:12Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Preventing Sybil Attacks by Privilege Attenuation:  A Design Principle for Social Network Systems</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/1880/48433</link>
      <description>Title: Preventing Sybil Attacks by Privilege Attenuation:  A Design Principle for Social Network Systems
Authors: Fong, Philip
Abstract: In Facebook-style Social Network Systems (FSNSs), which are a generalization&#xD;
of the access control model of Facebook, an access control policy speci es a graph-&#xD;
theoretic relationship between the resource owner and resource accessor that must hold&#xD;
in the social graph in order for access to be granted. Pseudonymous identities may&#xD;
collude to alter the topology of the social graph and gain access that would otherwise&#xD;
be forbidden. We formalize Denning's Principle of Privilege Attenuation (POPA) as a&#xD;
run-time property, and demonstrate that it is a necessary and su cient condition for&#xD;
preventing the above form of Sybil attacks. A static policy analysis is then devised for&#xD;
verifying that an FSNS is POPA compliant (and thus Sybil free). The static analysis is&#xD;
proven to be both sound and complete. We also extend our analysis to cover a peculiar&#xD;
feature of FSNS, namely, what Fong et al. dubbed as Stage-I Authorization. We&#xD;
discuss the anomalies resulted from this extension, and point out the need to redesign&#xD;
Stage-I Authorization to support a rational POPA-compliance analysis.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Mar 2011 16:04:08 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/1880/48433</guid>
      <dc:date>2011-03-03T16:04:08Z</dc:date>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>

