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    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/1880/48163</link>
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    <pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2013 17:48:10 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2013-05-20T17:48:10Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Examining the effects of guarantee funds on pension plans</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/1880/48708</link>
      <description>Title: Examining the effects of guarantee funds on pension plans
Authors: Nielson, Norma
Abstract: Bankruptcy risk falls to pension plan participants if a plan sponsor fails when a defined benefit&#xD;
(DB) pension plan is underfunded. This article examines the incidence of that risk and how it&#xD;
changes when public policy provides a guarantee fund. Although government-based guarantee&#xD;
funds are in a unique position to provide pension protection, primarily because of the extent to&#xD;
which the risk of sponsor default is systematic in nature, a looming question is the extent to which&#xD;
such guarantees are exposed to moral hazard. The article focuses on that question using data&#xD;
from four Canadian provinces, including one (Ontario) that operates a guarantee fund for pensions.&#xD;
The findings show that plan assets per DB-plan participant increase with the earnings of&#xD;
workers and decrease with higher unemployment, and that level of assets also is moderated by&#xD;
the influence of taxes, with higher plan assets observed when and where tax rates are higher.&#xD;
Plans in Ontario had on average $20,035 less in asset value per participant, and Ontario plans&#xD;
covered by the guarantee fund had an average of $16,497 less per participant than other Canadian&#xD;
DB plans not backed by a guarantee fund. A separate model finds the presence of a&#xD;
guarantee fund to be one of a very small number of variables significant in explaining variability&#xD;
in the plans’ funded ratios. These empirical results are consistent with the existence of moral&#xD;
hazard.
Description: © Society of Actuaries, Schaumburg, Illinois. Posted with permission granted August 5, 2011.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Ethics, Insurance and Information</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/1880/48463</link>
      <description>Title: Ethics, Insurance and Information
Authors: Nielson, Norma
Description: Article deposited after permission was granted by publisher of Canadian Insurance, 03/18/2011.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 1998 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/1880/48463</guid>
      <dc:date>1998-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>LONG-TERM LIABILITY FOR CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE IN DEPLETED NORTH AMERICAN OIL AND GAS RESERVOIRS A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/1880/48408</link>
      <description>Title: LONG-TERM LIABILITY FOR CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE IN DEPLETED NORTH AMERICAN OIL AND GAS RESERVOIRS A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Authors: Nielson, Norma; Ingelson, Allan; Kleffner, Anne
Abstract: State legislation in North America that addresses whether a government will accept long-term liability for damage arising from the release of carbon dioxide (CO2) after capture and storage (CCS) in depleted oil and gas reservoirs is in its infancy. Three states have developed legislation that conveys two different approaches to long-term liability. The federal governments in the United States and Canada have not developed legislation to address the issue. This article examines emerging legislative frameworks, in a limited number of jurisdictions, that have been adopted to manage long-term liability: viz., Wyoming, Kansas, Montana, the European Union (EU), and Australia. The majority of state governments to date, including Wyoming, Kansas, and the State of Victoria in Australia, are not prepared to assume long-term liability, while the EU and the State of Montana are prepared to proceed with a conditional transfer of liability from the CCS developer/operator to the government. We conclude that while a model that incorporates a conditional transfer of liability to a “pool,” such as in Montana and the EU, may encourage more investment in CCS, such a model does not incorporate the “polluter pays” principle. Arguably the incentive is greater to prevent future gas releases and thereby minimize the long-term risk to the public in jurisdictions such as Wyoming, Kansas, and the State of Victoria, where the CCS developer and/or operator retains long-term liability under the common law. As has been the practice in some jurisdictions in the North American petroleum industry, if the CCS developer/operator is either required to purchase and maintain third party liability insurance, or to post a bond or other form of security with the government for site remediation and reclamation, such an approach will help to minimize the long-term liability for the government and taxpayers. However, in the case of CCS, given the extraordinarily long duration of the risk associated with carbon storage, it is by no means certain that either insurance or bonds can be purchased for such an extended time period. We recommend a pooling approach to the management of remediation and reclamation funds based largely on arguments that it is more economically efficient to do so. While it would be theoretically possible for such a pool to be private, it is likely that the need for independent oversight will result in a governmental entity assuming the management function for such a liability/compensation scheme.
Description: Article depostied after permission was granted by publisher of Energy Law Journal, 02/01/2011.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/1880/48408</guid>
      <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Information and Ethics in Insurance</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/1880/48398</link>
      <description>Title: Information and Ethics in Insurance
Authors: Nielson, Norma; Brown, D J; Gammill, L; Seville, M A
Abstract: Insurance companies have a right to gather information about persons who wish to apply for insurance. That right has to be balanced by the applicant's right to privacy. Insurance companies abuse personal information at their own and the industry's risk. The issues involved are explored, research examined and the following recommendations are made: privacy concerns of customers are legitimate and the insurance industry must take appropriate steps to secure data; careful data handling can be a competitive advantage and if it is deserved it should be taken; almost every public policy activity of insurers, agents and trade organizations can have secondary effects that deal with data and privacy; rules governing the privacy of data will evolve from social values and produce a body of common law; and, to combat unacceptable regulation of insurance industry data practices, work proactively to develop a system that will provide the regulation.
Description: This article originally appeared in the Winter 1998 issue of the CPCU Journal and is reprinted with permission of the CPCU Society, Malvern, PA. Permission granted by publisher 01/13/2011.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 1998 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>1998-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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