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dc.contributor.advisorChurch, Jeffrey
dc.contributor.authorAta, Michael Norman
dc.date2019-11
dc.date.accessioned2019-08-14T14:09:59Z
dc.date.available2019-08-14T14:09:59Z
dc.date.issued2019-04-12
dc.identifier.citationAta, M. N. (2019). Essays on Endogenous Behaviour in Antitrust Litigation (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1880/110719
dc.description.abstractIn this thesis, I formulate and assess the strategic interaction between a firm and competition authority (CA) as a game. Unlike prior models of litigation, I allow the CA to be non-committal over enforcement by allowing the aggressiveness of firm activity to influence its choice of policy, where aggressiveness is defined as an act that sets objective probabilities over consequences. By allowing non-commitment over policy enforcement, I focus on how an endogenous policy response to firm activity influences decisions made in equilibrium, and its subsequent impact on social welfare. In Chapter 1, I conduct a review of law, policy, and economics literature on the topic of antitrust litigation, and law and economics in general. I find the conventional method of modeling in law and economics and antitrust-specific settings imposes commitment over a government/legal authorities policy before agents decide whether to take a welfare benign (or legal) or harmful (illegal) action. I argue that because unilateral firm conduct has progressed to be evaluated under an effects-based standard, aggressiveness may influence the thoroughness of evidence presented in adjudication. In Chapter 2, I formalize the strategic interaction between a firm and CA as a game and assess their interaction. I find that conditional on firm aggressiveness, there are three general policy ranges that are viable for the CA to implement: forgoing investigation, investigation with minimal effort in adjudication, and investigation with non-minimal effort. I find all three policy ranges are viable in equilibrium. I further find a potential perverse effect may occur in equilibrium; increasing the CAs efficiency or resources in adjudication may decrease social welfare. The decrease is attributable to the CA and firm; increasing efficiency or resources in adjudication alters the CAs enforcement policy, which the firm responds to. The firms' optimal choice of aggressiveness may increase in response to either effect. In Chapter 3, I extend the model formulated in Chapter 2 to evaluate how a multiple firm environment affects firm aggressiveness and the CAs enforcement policy.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsUniversity of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.en_US
dc.subject.classificationEconomicsen_US
dc.titleEssays on Endogenous Behaviour in Antitrust Litigationen_US
dc.typedoctoral thesisen_US
dc.publisher.facultyArtsen_US
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Calgaryen
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy (PhD)en_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Calgaryen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberHollis, Aidan
dc.contributor.committeememberRoberts, Joanne
dc.contributor.committeememberMigrow, Dimitri
dc.contributor.committeememberLandeo, Claudia M.
ucalgary.item.requestcopytrueen_US


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